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INTRODUCTION

Legion are the judicial statements that the antenuptial contract 1 is
favored by public policy as being conducive to the welfare of the marriage
relationship, and useful toward removing one of the frequent causes of
family disputes-contentions about marital property rights.2 If an antenuptial contract does serve such high, noble and encompassing purposes,
then it would seem mandatory for attorneys to utilize this device frequently. However, the cases involving antenuptial contracts are comparatively few in number. Of course, the preferred analysis would be that such
cases are few in number because the majority of antenuptial contracts are
never involved in litigation. However, this writer believes that, to a great
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University, Birmingham, Alabama; J.D. University of Alabama, 1968; LL.M. Harvard University, 1971.
1. Also called prenuptial contract, antenuptial agreement and antenuptial settlement.
See 3A WORDS AND PHRASES 32 (1953); 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS 90-22 (1964).
2. See, e.g., Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970); French v. McAnarney, 290
Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); Gartner v. Gartner, 246 Minn. 319, 74 N.W.2d 809
(1956); Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1962); In re Moore's Estate, 210
Ore. 23, 307 P.2d 483 (1957).
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extent, the infrequent use of the antenuptial contracts is due to the fact
that it is largely a forgotten instrument. The reasons are three-fold: (1)
attorneys do not suggest its use; (2) few couples avail themselves of premarital legal counseling; and (3) the attitude of the courts toward antenuptial contracts is so restrictive, indefinite and unpredictable as to
preclude widespread and consistent use.
The task before every court faced with possible enforcement of an
antenuptial contract is to explore the extent to which espoused parties will
be allowed to alter the incidents of their forthcoming marriage. If two
mature individuals, prior to marriage, determine by contract some of the
incidents of the marital relationship, undoubtedly their concern will focus
primarily upon two contingencies-divorce and death. This article will
discuss the stipulation of rights and liabilities upon the happening of
either event. An underlying issue, however, which will be treated first,
is the role of the lawyer in premarital planning.
At least one writer has suggested that it is just as logical for a lawyer
to help the parties in preparation for marriage as it is for a doctor to aid
them.3 The idea is that the spouses' relationship with any attorney can be,
and often is, just as extended and recurrent as their relationship with a
physician. On this basis, one can consider the feasibility of the engaged
couple discussing and subsequently drafting an antenuptial contract which
will be a guide to the rights and liabilities of their marriage relationship.
If the lawyer is given and accepts this expanded role in domestic relations,
then obviously his effectiveness will be determined by the attitude of the
courts toward these agreements. If this role as a marital counselor is to be
adequately developed, these contracts must be judged objectively rather
than with a preconceived attitude that they are automatically void. There
must also be a reexamination of those areas of marital rights which have
heretofore been forbidden as subjects of antenuptial contracts. This will
further require a reexamination of the sociological realities of today's marriages and an updating of judicial attitudes regarding them.
It is the hope of this writer that at least the four following points will
be made clear during the course of this article: (1) that there are, today,
uses for the antenuptial contract which are largely ignored: (2) that many
of the uses for the antenuptial contract are equally applicable to the young
compassionate couple as well as to the older companionable one; (3) that
the courts have often taken too negative a view of antenuptial contracts,
an attitude which has contributed to their disuse; and (4) that even
though the male's supposed intellectual dominance over the woman is
seen throughout the law of antenuptial agreements as requiring legal protection for the "weaker" female, this premise is contrary both to the contemporary concept of the equality of women and to the freedom of mature
parties to chart the rights and liabilities of their marriage relationship.
3. Javert, Guidelines for a Marriage Contract, 4 TRIAL 46 (1968).
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INSTRUMENT

FOR MODERN

ANTENUPTIAL

CONTRACT-OLD

TIMES-A PANORAMA OF USES

The traditional applications of the antenuptial contract are but two
of the many possible uses for this instrument. It would, perhaps, be too
presumptuous to claim that this arrangement is coming into its own as a
viable interrspousal instrument. However, antenuptial contract litigation
is constantly increasing in practically every jurisdiction. It has been reported, for example, that over a two year period, the State of Florida experienced a four-fold increase in such litigation.4 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals has observed this trend, remarking that antenuptial contracts
have become a fruitful source of litigation in that state. 5 In response to
this phenomenon of increasing litigation, one of two conclusions are possible: (1) that more people are using the antenuptial contract to govern
inter-spousal rights and liabilities; or (2) that there are simply more
people contesting these agreements in the courts. The former conclusion
would seem to be more logical.
If increasingly more people are utilizing antenuptial contracts, then
the courts will be faced with several challenges. First, the courts will be
compelled to reevaluate their approach to areas, such as spousal support,
in which espoused parties have historically been forbidden to contract.
As more people attempt to contract premaritally in these areas, courts
will then be obliged to decide whether there is too great a lag between
legal precedent and the societal norm.'
Secondly, the courts must decide whether the applicable rules governing these instruments are sufficiently definite, clear and predictable. As
more people enter into antenuptial contracts, it will be mandatory for the
courts to formulate concrete rules that will facilitate the execution of these
legally binding agreements.
The third challenge that will be facing the courts, in the wake of increased use of premarital agreements, is the recognition or nonrecognition
of newly conceived uses for the antenuptial contract. These instruments
are largely an untapped source of private ordering of marital rights and
liabilities. Increased recognition and utilization of these instruments will
give rise to new and wider uses for them.
A.

Use of the Antenuptial Contract to Alter or Liquidate the Husband's
Duty to Support the Wife

The approach of the courts to any antenuptial contract governing
the husband's duty of support has generally been a negative one. This
duty of the husband has been viewed as one of the untouchables among
4. Murray, Family Law, 1961-62 Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MIAmi L. REv. 231,
251 (1963).
5. Brown v. Brown, 265 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1954).
6. V. AUBERT, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 90 (1969).
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legal responsibilities. 7 Despite this negative judicial attitude, prospective
spouses have continued their attempts, via the antenuptial contract, to
avoid, alter or liquidate the husband's duty of support. Such attempts will
continue since they reflect a change in our society regarding marital financing. Although any argument that a husband should be allowed by
contract to entirely absolve himself of the support duty is perhaps futile,
there nevertheless is a trend in our society towards absolving the husband from total responsibility for support of the family. This would appear to be a manifestation of the nation-wide trend of legal equality for
men and women. 8 The passage of state statutes making the wife secondarily liable for the family's support when she has sufficient means and her
husband does not, is a step in the direction of taking the entire burden for
support off the husband's shoulders. This same idea would appear to be
the basis of those statutes in community property states which impose
mutual obligations of support on both the husband and wife.' 0 Inextricably
connected with this trend toward equalization of the support burden, and
in some measure justifying it, is the constant increase in the married female work force." This trend would seem to indicate that the husband's
duty of support should be subject to some modification. If the marriage
is viewed as a partnership or joint venture, then some equalization of the
family support burden between husband and wife is in order.
There are some decisions which indicate a judicial recognition of
the power of spouses to alter the support duty. 2 These cases, however,
are few in number because couples generally have not been satisfied to
merely alter the husband's duty of support. Practically every antenuptial
7. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Smith v. Smith,
154 Ga. 702, 115 S.E. 723 (1922) ; Warner v. Warner, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908);
French v. McNarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C.
190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961).
8. See C. FOOTE, R. LEvy & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 308
(1966).
9. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page 1960).

10. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West Supp. 1971):
The wife must support the husband when they are living together out of her
separate property when he has no separate property and there is no community
property or quasi-community property and he is unable from infirmity, to support
himself.
See also WASH. RIv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (1961):
The expenses of the family and the education of the children are chargeable upon
the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto
they may be sued jointly or separately.
11. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, table
no. 35 (91st ed. 1970).

Out of 47,038,000 married women in the 1969 population of the United States, 19,100,00
worked outside the home. Thus, out of the entire female married population, 39.6 percent
were in the labor force. Id. at table no. 330. Those married women compose 63.9 percent of
the entire female labor force in the United States. In 1964, figures revealed that in 21 percent of those families where the wife worked full time throughout the year, she contributed
at least one-half of the total family income. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 319 (1965).

12. See notes 13-17 infra and accompanying text.
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contract involving support provides for a complete abrogation of the support duty, and the courts, as reflected by their negative attitudes, are not
ready to allow such a broad freedom of contract between espoused parties.
In harmony with the ideas of the family as a partnership and the
equalization of husband and wife, an Iowa antenuptial contract provision
of the early 1900's presents a reasonable example of the type of support
modification that is most likely to be enforced by the courts. This provision, presented in the case of In re Mansfield's Estate,'3 reads as follows: "Each party hereto hereby agrees to contribute to the family running expenses in proportion to their net income from their respective
properties."14 Although the court in Mansfield held this agreement to be
binding and enforceable, the decision as a whole was somewhat less than
encouraging. The contested issue was whether the widow could enforce
the contract against her deceased husband's estate. However, the crucial
question was whether the court would have enforced the contract provision had it been sued upon during a going marriage (the court at least
implied that it would have enforced it). Although Mansfield was not a
strong endorsement of interspousal power to alter support during marriage, it is, nevertheless, a recognition that the ability to alter the support
obligation may be possible. However, an application of Mansfield has
not been forthcoming due principally to two factors: (1) the only antenuptials contracts which the courts have been asked to enforce are those
providing for a complete abrogation of the husband's duty of support;
and (2) all the cases involving antenuptial contracts modifying support
have been decided on collateral issues. The issue of support modification
versus abrogation has never been squarely presented to or answered by
the courts.
For example, in the Kentucky case of Atkins v. Atkins, 15 an antenuptial contract essentially provided that the husband and wife would be
liable for their respective necessities. This clause presented a perfect opportunity for a court to resolve the question of whether a premarital
support modification agreement would be enforced during the marriage.
However, due to the manner in which the case arose and the form of the
resulting decision, this was not to be. The litigation commenced after the
wife's death and concerned whether, under the contract, the husband or
the wife's administrator would pay for her last doctor bills. The court
held that the husband was responsible for paying the physician and that
the antenuptial contract was void insofar as it might affect third persons.
Although the decision was encouraging in its failure to completely void
the support modification agreement, it was equally disappointing since
the court, in holding the agreement void as to creditors, barred any substantial alteration of the husband's duty to support his wife.
13. 185 Iowa 339, 170 N.W. 415 (1919).
14. Id. at 341, 170 N.W. at 415.
15. 203 Ky. 291, 262 S.W. 268 (1924).
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An Iowa decision at least implied some judicial propitiousness for
antenuptial liquidation of the husband's support obligation. In re Thorman's Estate6 involved an antenuptial contract stipulating that the husband would pay the wife $104 per year as long as the couple lived together. However, the contract also contained a provision waiving the
wife's rights in the husband's estate. The wife argued that the entire contract was void because of the provision liquidating support. The court
did not accept this argument and held the contract valid. This decision,
however, was far from a complete recognition of support modification.
The court emphasized that it had no evidence of the husband's assets,
and apparently would not have held this liquidation clause valid if it
had been found to be unfair in light of the husband's means.
Garlock v. Garlock17 is the only reported case in which a court has
squarely faced the issue of whether to enforce a support liquidation contract during a marriage. In Garlock, the husband and wife postnuptially
agreed that the husband would pay the wife $15,000 per year in twelve
equal monthly payments. This was to be in lieu of all support, but excepted any expenses incurred by the wife during sickness. The husband
ceased making payments under the agreement after three years, and the
wife then brought suit upon the contract. In upholding the contract,
the lower court recognized that the
husband and wife are best qualified to judge the amount required for the wife's support. They are at liberty to reduce to a
certainty the amount of money which the husband will pay to
discharge an obligation which might cost him more or less than
what he has agreed to pay.' 8
However, this declaration of marital freedom was shortlived. In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals came to the wife's rescue
and stated its concern that "out of the goodness of her heart and in reliance upon his good nature she may have signed such a contract of her
own free will, and yet no court would hold her bound by it, especially if
she became in need through sickness or other misfortune." 9 Despite the
Court of Appeals' definitive refusal to enforce this contract, two questions remain unanswered: (1) would the court's attitude have been different if this had been an antenuptial contract rather than a postnuptial
one; and (2) is there any formula that can be devised which will give the
support liquidation contract judicial survival?
Whatever progress is made toward modifying support agreements
after marriage will depend upon the form of the agreement before the
16.
17.
(1939).
18.
19.

162 Iowa 316, 144 N.W. 5 (1913).
255 App. Div. 88, 5 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1938),

rev'd 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521

Id. at 90, 5 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 341, 18 N.E.2d 521, 522 (1939).
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court. The foregoing cases indicate that, to be enforceable, such an instrument must have the following characteristics:
(1) It cannot be a complete abrogation of the husband's support
duty;
(2) There must be evidenced an attitude of the spouses that
the marriage is a partnership in which both must bear the
financial burden;
(3) The wife must have some separate income unless the husband contracts to pay an amount sufficient to provide completely for her;
(4) The agreement should provide that the husband will remain responsible for unforeseen expenses of his wife; and
(5) The amount contracted for by the husband should not be
unreasonable in light of his means.
B.

Use of the Antenuptial Contract to Prevent One Spouse from
Contesting the Other's Will
Another function of the antenuptial contract is to give one a sense
of testate security. With all the possible pitfalls involved in the proper
execution of a will, a testator or testatrix may find it comforting to know
that at least the spouse will not be contesting the validity of his or her
expressed wishes. The ever present possibility of an invalid will is compounded by the number of people who execute these instruments without
legal advice. Certainly there is no greater frustration than the thought
that one's estate planning could be completely disrupted by a spouse's
discovery of some legal defect in the will, allowing that spouse to receive
an intestate share of the estate. Likewise, there is the possibility that the
wife, even in the absence of valid grounds, will contest the will and thereby
thwart the testator's wishes by causing added and unexpected expenses
for his estate. If a husband provides a limited amount for his wife in his
will or disinherits her (ignoring for the moment her right to dissent and
take a dower interest), then the antenuptial contract stands as an added
assurance that his testamentary wishes will be carried out.
The legality of this use for the antenuptial contract has been litigated
only in very few instances. Generally, where prospective spouses renounce
any rights to each other's property in an antenuptial contract, the survivor is estopped from contesting the will of the deceased spouse. The
body of cases constituting the law in this area are of the older variety,
and have been infrequently cited in more recent decisions. For example,
in an 1854 Maryland case, Maurer v. Naill,2 the prospective spouses
executed an antenuptial contract providing that at the death of either
spouse his or her property would not be claimed by the survivor. The
husband then made a will but failed to have it witnessed. Despite this
20. 5 Md. 324 (1854).
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defect, the court held that the antenuptial contract deprived the widow
of any standing to contest the validity of this will.
This rule of law was applied again, forty-nine years later, in Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff.21 In that case, the husband had executed a will prior
to his second marriage. After his death, his widow argued that their marriage automatically revoked any disposition of property to the children
of his former marriage. Her litigous plan, however, was foiled when the
court held that she had no standing to contest the will because of an antenuptial agreement in which she had waived all interest in her husband's
estate.
The most recent case involving a spouse's standing to contest a will
was In re Green's Estate.22 In that case, instead of waiving all interest
in her prospective spouse's estate, the contesting wife antenuptially agreed
to receive $18,000 per year for life in lieu of all interests in her husband's
estate. The court held that even though the will was executed prior to their
marriage, the wife had no standing to contest the will's admission to probate.
Because only a few reported cases have involved the use of an antenuptial contract to defeat a surviving spouse's right to share in the deceased spouse's estate, several questions remain unanswered. The first
question is whether an antenuptial contract providing only that the wife
promises not to contest would preclude her from contesting her husband's
will. Obviously, waiver is inapplicable because no waiver of property
rights by the wife has taken place. No case has been found involving the
enforcement of an antenuptial agreement whereby one spouse expressly
promises not to contest the other's will. When and if the courts are faced
with this problem, the answer will likely be found by an analogy to postnuptial agreements, where the traditional rule is that a bona fide agreement to refrain from contesting the will by one interested in the testator's
estate is valid.2"
The second question regarding the antenuptial contract as a bar to
contesting the deceased spouse's will is whether the agreement must meet
the requirements normally imposed upon an antenuptial contract-good
faith and full disclosure.24 The reported decisions conspicuously lack any
discussion of this question. For example, as pointed out by an Arizona
court, 25 the Kentucky court in Biggerstaf26 simply assumed that the con-

tract was validly executed and that the wife entered into the contract
freely and intelligently. The only substantive comment upon this question by any court was that of a New York surrogate court judge who
wrote:
21. 95 Ky. 154, 23 S.W. 965 (1893).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

165 Misc. 108, 2 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
See Annot., 55 A.L.R. 811 (1928).
See section IV, B infra.
In re Mackevich's Estate, 93 Ariz. 129, 379 P.2d 119 (1963).
95 Ky. 154, 23 S.W. 965 (1893).
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I have considered the evidence and the arguments advanced by
counsel in their briefs. I am satisfied that the execution of the
antenuptial agreement by [the wife] was not procured by fraud
of any kind but, on the contrary, that she signed it voluntarily
with knowledge and understanding of its provisions .... 27
This comment implies that for a valid premarital waiver of a wife's right
or standing to contest her husband's will, the wife must be afforded all
the safeguards normally called for in the execution of any antenuptial
contract waiving property rights. 8
A final unanswered question is whether a wife may still be estopped
to contest her husband's will even though the antenuptial contract is invalid. The only case directly dealing with this question, In re Mackevich's
Estate,2 9 held that the antenuptial contract was void because an applicable
state statute provided that any agreement attempting to alter the laws
concerning the descent of property was invalid.
Despite the invalidity of the contract, the beneficiaries of the deceased husband's will argued that by executing the antenuptial agreement, the wife had impliedly agreed to the distribution in the will which
was executed prior to their marriage. Thus, the wife was estopped to assert
the invalidity of the agreement because the deceased husband relied upon
her assent to the will's effectiveness. Although the court finally denied recovery to the beneficiaries of the husband's will, it recognized that a theory
of estoppel could apply to such cases. The estoppel doctrine was not applicable to these particular facts because pertinent provisions of the antenuptial agreement were inserted and the contract was signed without the
prospective husband and wife having read it. With these elements missing, the court held that there was no estoppel. The importance of this
decision is not its holding, but rather the recognition that a wife may be
estopped to contest her husband's will after executing an invalid antenuptial contract in which she waives that right or waives her standing
to contest. Although these cases leave several questions unanswered, it
appears that the security to be gained by the use of antenuptial contracts
far outweighs any uncertainty that may occur in enforcing them.
C.

Use of the Antenuptial Contract to Abrogate the Community
Property Regime
Prospective spouses who reside in a typical community property
state are faced with a system that classifies both property acquired and
income derived during the marriage as community property. It is readily
predictable that some engaged parties will desire to circumvent such an
established doctrine.
There are several conceivable reasons why parties would desire to
27. In re Green's Estate, 165 Misc. 108, 109, 2 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
28. Cf. In re Estate of Harris, 431 Pa. 293, 245 A.2d 647 (1968).
29. 93 Ariz. 129, 379 P.2d 119 (1963).
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avoid the effects of the community property system: (1) the prospective
wife may have children by a prior marriage and may wish to use her income solely for their support; (2) the prospective husband may accumulate income far in excess of that needed to support his wife and thus wish
to have it remain his separate property; and (3) both spouses may prefer
to keep property acquired during marriage separate in the event of divorce or death. These motives for using the antenuptial contract to avoid
the community property laws are by no means exclusive, but are offered
to indicate that the antenuptial agreement is still a viable instrument in
community property states.
The validity of the antenuptial contract in community property states
depends on how receptive the particular jurisdiction is to abrogation of
its community property rules. This determination often depends upon legislative interpretation and history. The community property states, especially Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and
Washington,8" derive their property concepts from the Spanish system. 8
The Louisiana system, on the other hand, is based on the French property
system. 2 The important point, however, is that both the Spanish and
French community property systems were grounded upon an optional
basis. The parties were presumed to have adopted the community property laws unless they provided otherwise. 3 As one authority phrases it:
"[I]t was permitted to the spouses to contract, agree or stipulate as between themselves either before, at the time of or even during marriage,
as to the manner in which they wished to share the property earned or
gained during the marriage." 34 This historical receptiveness of the community property system to abrogation by private agreement was carried
over into the American jurisdictions. Most of the community property
states have prefaced their community property statutes with a provision
that they are only applicable if the spouses have made no agreement to
the contrary. 5 If the prospective spouses enter into an agreement altering
the community property laws, they are said to have created a "conventional community."8 6 Some authorities describe this as creating a "contractual community," as opposed to entering into3 1no agreement and thus
allowing the imposition of a "legal community."
30. See A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 266 (1969).
31. See P. DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMlfUNITY PROPERTY § 58 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as DE FUNmAs]; Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal
Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REv. 20 (1967).
32. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TuL. L. REv. 3 (1959).
33. See DE FUNIACK, supra note 31, at § 58; Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20 (1967).
34. DE FUNIAK, supra note 31, at § 135.
35. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-201 (1956); CAL. Civ. CODE § 5133 (West
Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-916 (1963); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2325, 2332
(West 1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.010 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-2-6 (1953); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.120 (1958).
36. W. BunBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 238 (1965).
37. See Clay v. United States, 161 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1947).
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It should be noted that the power to enter into an agreement creating a conventional community within a community property system is
recognized in all of the community property states with the exception of
Texas. 8 It is the unqualified doctrine in Texas that prospective spouses
cannot antenuptially contract in order to circumvent the community property laws. 9 The Texas position is based upon a state statute which provides that "[p] arties intending to marry may enter into such stipulations
as they may desire, provided they be not contrary to ... some rule of law
...

,,4o Texas courts reason that antenuptial contracts attempting to alter

the community property laws fall within this prohibition.41 This reasoning
has met with strong criticism, and one writer offers the stinging suggestion
that "[t]his irrational rule was not only ill-considered when adopted, but
has also been erroneously cited as authority for some of the most fatuous
cases in Texas jurisprudence."4 2 Despite such criticism, however, the
doctrine is well entrenched in Texas law and antenuptial alteration of
the community property regime is an impossibility in that state.
Even though the majority of community property states allow the
antenuptial alteration of community property rights, there have been few
antenuptial contracts involved in litigation which have aimed at accomplishing this goal. In fact, the use of the antenuptial agreement to circumvent the community property regime has been attempted more often in
Texas, where it is illegal, than in the other six community property states,
where it is not prohibited by statute. In those other six states, only four
cases involving such agreements have been reported.43 In two of these
four cases, the issue contested was collateral to the question of enforcement of the antenuptial contract.
Of the two decisions directly on point, one involved the contractual
stipulation that salaried income would remain separate, while the other decision involved a contract provision aimed at keeping real property and
its income separate property. In the California case of Mitchell v. Tibbetts,4* the prospective wife had children from a prior marriage to whom
she wanted to devote her entire income. There was also a desire on the
part of the prospective husband to neither adopt these children nor support them. To resolve this situation the parties entered into an antenuptial
38. See W. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 238 (1965).

39. See, e.g., Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964); King v. Matney, 259 S.W.2d
606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Texas Bldg. & Mortg. Co. v. Rosenbaum, 159 S.W.2d 554

(Tex. Civ. App. 1942), aff'd, 140 Tex. 325, 167 S.W.2d 506 (1943); Chandler v. Alamo
Mfg. Co., 140 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933).
40. Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4610 (Supp. 1967).
41. See, e.g., Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
42. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19
BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 68 (1967).
43. Clay v. Unites States, 161 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 131 Cal.
App. 2d 480, 280 P.2d 860 (1955); Succession of Hollander, 208 La. 1038, 24 So.2d 69
(1945); Hamlin v. Merlino, 45 Wash. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954).
44. 131 Cal. App. 2d 480, 280 P.2d 860 (1955).
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contract providing that the wife's earnings would remain her separate
property. The court held that the parties had the power to validly enter
into such a contract and indicated that this same contract could have been
used to determine the status of the husband's income. The court displayed a favorable view toward this use of the antenuptial contract, via
its broad rule that a husband and wife may agree before marriage that
their future earnings be separate property.
Although Mitchell recognized the use of the antenuptial contract to
alter the concept of community property, it failed to establish the requirements for valid execution of the contract. However, two requirements for
such contracts were imposed in the Washington case of Hamlin v.
Merino.4 5 In Hamlin, the prospective marriage partners contractually
provided that any income from their existing properties and any property
subsequently taken in either name would be separate rather than community property. The enforceability of this contract was put in issue
when the deceased wife's administrator claimed that all the property
acquired after the marriage became community property. The court observed that generally such contracts are valid and within the contracting
power of the parties. However, the court, apparently analogizing to antenuptial contracts that alter inter-spousal property rights upon death, took
refuge in the "confidential relationship" doctrine. The court said that,
due to the confidential relationship existing between engaged parties, the
husband must prove that his prospective wife fully understood the nature
and significance of the contract and that she freely and voluntarily entered into it. As is often the case, the surviving husband was unable to
meet this burden and the antenuptial contract was held void.
Regardless of the absence of definitive decisions, at least it can be
observed that there have been too few attempts to use the antenuptial
contract as a means of altering or abrogating community property rights.
There is a general state of amenability to such arrangements which private
parties have not sufficiently explored.
III.

STIPULATING RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES UPON DIVORCE VIA
THE ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT

A. Introduction
A man and woman, about to be married, are well aware of the prevailing divorce rate. With this in mind, they may attempt to provide for
this contingency in an antenuptial contract by settling their respective
rights and liabilities.46 However, such provisions of the antenuptial con45. 45 Wash. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954).
46. The provisions of this agreement, as revealed in a survey of the reported cases, may
be in any one of the following forms:
(1) If the wife files for divorce, she forfeits all rights in the husband's property
and all right to alimony.
(2) If either the husband or wife files for divorce, the moving party forfeits all
interest in the marital property and in the separate property of the other.
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tract are invariably voided when presented to those courts which apply
the "contrary-to-public-policy" rule. 7 This rule, applied more vigorously
by earlier decisions, is as follows, "any ante-nuptial bargain that looks
toward, provides for, facilitates, or tends to induce a separation or divorce after marriage, is contrary to public policy and void." 48 Apparently,
this rule began as a rebuttable presumption. Now, however, the rule seems
to have become an absolute one which is applied to any antenuptial agreement contingent upon divorce. 9 This public policy rule is used regularly
as a basis for voiding an antenuptial contract contingent upon divorce,
with total disregard for whether or not the agreement actually encourages
divorce. The reasons for the public policy rule's long tenure in the courts
are two-fold. First, there are a few instances in which the antenuptial contract has been used for despicable purposes and secondly, these instances
have been met with strong and emotional statements by judges. The public
policy rule had one of its most vigorous applications in an early Colorado
case where the court, faced with an antenuptial contract providing for
an uncontested divorce without alimony in exchange for payment to the
wife of $100 per year, said that the instrument was a "wicked device"
and "an attempt . . . to legalize prostitution . . . ."' Although this particular contract illustrated a specific evil, later courts have used this language to justify striking down all antenuptial contracts contingent upon
divorce.
B.

Arguments Used to Support Application of the Public
Policy Rule
A survey of antenuptial cases reveals that courts vary in their reasons and arguments for invoking the public policy rule to void antenuptial
contracts that look toward divorce. Some of the reasons are:
(3) If the wife files for divorce, she forfeits all rights to any alimony from the
husband.
(4) If the marriage ends in divorce, the wife receives $in settlement of all
her rights in the husband's property.
(5) If the marriage ends in divorce then the wife receives $in settlement
of all her rights to alimony.
(6) If the marriage ends in divorce then the wife receives $
as support and
no interest in the husband's property.
(7) If the marriage ends in divorce the wife receives no alimony and no interest
in the husband's property.
(8) If the marriage ends in divorce, neither party can claim any interest in the
separate property of the other.
(9) Upon marriage, a trust will be set up by the husband with the income to be
payable to the wife and the corpus to go to her upon the husband's death;
but in the event of divorce, the corpus returns to the husband.
(10) If the marriage ends in divorce the wife receives $
in lieu of all her
rights in the husband's property. If the marriage lasts until the death of the
husband then the wife receives $in lieu of all her rights in his property.
This list of possible provisions is by no means exhaustive, but is merely offered as a picture
of some honest attempts by mature parties to provide for the divorce contingency.
47. Hereinafter referred to as the "public policy rule."
48. 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS 90-27 (1964).
49. One is tempted to describe this as a per se rule.
50. In re Duncan's Estate, 87 Colo. 149, 152, 285 P. 757, 757 (1930).
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(1) To allow parties to premaritarilly contemplate divorce under
a written contract is legally improper since it is contrary to the concept
of marriage in our society.
(2) There is a hesitancy on the part of the courts to give the marriage relationship any of the incidents of an ordinary contract. There
seems to be a basic fear that allowing parties to alter the rights and liabilities incident to divorce will cause the institution of marriage to lose
its dignity and sacredness."
(3) Enforcement of antenuptial contracts would open the door for
spouses to determine contractually even the most minor incidents of their
marriage relationship. The fear is that to uphold such contracts would
create an endless field for controversy and bickering. Such matters as the
allowance the husband or wife may receive, the number of dresses a wife
may own or the places where they will spend their vacations would be
proper subjects for antenuptial contracts.
(4) If a husband is allowed to limit his liability in the event of divorce, there is a possibility that the wife will have to be supported by the
state.
(5) Many courts approach the application of the public policy rule
by saying that if the husband's liability upon divorce is limited or completely abrogated by antenuptial contract, then such an agreement encourages the husband to leave his wife, and thus facilitates divorce. The
apparent theory is that such a contract makes it profitable for the property-owning spouse to abandon his marriage partner.2
(6) When the antenuptial contract provides that if either party files
for divorce he forgoes all rights, even though it would seem to discourage
divorce, courts will also void this agreement under the public policy rule.
The argument here is that such an agreement places an innocent party,
i.e., the wife, in a position where she would be forced to endure conduct
which would constitute grounds for divorce because of fear that the commencement of a divorce action would deprive her of property rights and
a means of support. 3
(7) There is a belief among some courts that the settlement of divorce rights is a task that has historically been the job of equity courts.
Thus, there is a basic opposition to any preemption in the area by the
prospective spouses themselves.54
C.

Arguments in Support of Abandoning the Public Policy Rule

There are several reasons why the public policy rule should not invalidate all antenuptial contracts that look toward divorce.
51. See Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
52. See, e.g., Kalsem v. Froland 207 Iowa 994, 222 N.W. 3 (1928); Englund v Englund,
286 Minn. 227, 175 N.W.2d 461 (1970); Appleby v. Appleby, 100 Minn. 408, 111 N.W. 305
(1907).
53. See Sanders v. Sanders, 40 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (1956).
54. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 206 So.2d 416 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), quashed, 233 So.2d
381 (Fla. 1970); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
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(1) The first argument against the use of the public policy rule is
sociological. As early as 1927, a well known sociologist observed that "a
woman's right to financial support from the husband when she has divorced him has been taken for granted so long that we have assumed its
justice as a matter of course and it was developed during the days when
matrimony was the only vocation of women.''" Today, matrimony is not
the only vocation of women, and our entire nation is becoming increasingly aware of women's rights with respect to any area of vocational endeavor. It is suggested that adult parties today, prior to marriage, should
be allowed to provide for the question of alimony without having that
provision declared void per se as a violation of public policy. A further
aspect of this sociological argument against the public policy rule is that
to facilitate the divorce process does not mean there will be an automatic
increase in the divorce rate. This argument is based upon the sociological
observation ,that the easiest divorce law by no means produces the greatest number of divorces." 6
(2) The public policy rule manifests a basic discrimination between
the divorcee and the widow. The courts applying the public policy rule
maintain that the state has an interest in seeing that a husband performs
his obligations of supporting his wife. Of course, most states also have an
interest in providing for the widow to the extent that they provide her by
statute with a fraction of his estate. Yet, public policy approves antenuptial contracts limiting the dower obligation while voiding those contracts limiting alimony rights.57 It seems unfair to assert that the support
of a divorcee is of more concern to the state than that of a widow. However, if that is not the case, then antenuptial contracts which are prima
facie valid in respect to the widow should be equally valid when they concern the divorcee, as long as the ascertainable and reasonable effect of the
agreement is not to promote the dissolution of the marriage. The courts
should recognize that with divorce such a commonplace fact of life, many
prospective marriage partners might want to consider the disposition of
their property and the alimony rights of the wife in the event their marriage should fail. 8
(3) Suppose a wealthy woman wants to marry a low-income man
who is paying alimony to a previous wife and who has an invalid mother
to support. They want to get married but the man is hesitant because he
feels a duty to maintain his already existing obligations to his ex-wife
and mother. He is further hesitant because, having had firsthand experience, he is afraid that this second marriage may end in divorce, thus
burdening him with a second alimony obligation. In order to solve this
dilemma, the prospective wife, in no need of support by the husband,
55. E. GROVES,

SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE

FAMILY 156 (1927).

56. See B. RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS 223 (1929).
57. See, e.g., McClain's Estate v. McClain, 133 Ind. 645, 183 N.E.2d 842 (Ct. App. 1962)
(court declared divorce provisions void while enforcing death provisions).
58. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970).
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waives, by agreement, any possible future claim to alimony. By operation
of the public policy rule, however, the arrangement would be void per se.
It is arguable that, in this situation, the rule itself is against public policy
since it tends to discourage marriage.59
(4) By adopting a narrow construction of the public policy rule,
the inherent weaknesses of the rule can be seen. "[U]nder no circumstances may the parties before marriage come to a valid agreement concerning the wife's rights or the husband's obligations in case the marriage
is terminated by the courts."60 The rule can be stated even more narrowly:
"[U]nder no circumstances may the parties contemplating marriage recognize divorce as a possibility ... and make financial provision for that
contingency."'" Wise public policy would seem to disfavor such uncompromising statements which void any antenuptial agreement even mentioning divorce.
(5) In relationships other than marriage, contracts defining the expectations and responsibilities of the parties promote stability. The clarity
of contracts in the commercial world should be available in antenuptial
agreements. If not, there should at the very least be no presumption that
antenuptial agreements tend to promote discord in marriage. While commercial contracts defining the parties' rights are encouraged by the courts,
an antenuptial agreement making financial provision for the wife in the
event of divorce is held malum in se and is outlawed, no matter how
generous and regardless of the circumstances.
(6) Assume a husband and wife enter into an antenuptial contract
providing for certain rights upon divorce. The contract also provides that
upon the husband's death, the wife is to receive from his estate only what
he leaves her in his will. The thought might occur to the wife that she
takes a chance of receiving nothing by awaiting her husband's death.
Thus, she will sue for divorce and alimony knowing that the divorce provisions of the antenuptial contract will not be enforced against her.6 2 In
this fact situation, the public policy rule, which makes antenuptial contracts invalid per se, is itself conducive to divorce.
(7) The public policy rule manifests a judicial discrimination between married and unmarried women. It 'is widely held that after marriage a husband and wife can enter into a separation agreement settling
alimony and property rights contingent upon divorce. These agreements,
if free from fraud, may be sustained by the courts and made a part of a
divorce decree.6 z There would seem to be no reason why public policy
should protect the unmarried woman more than the married woman by
59. Posner v. Posner, 206 So.2d 416, 422 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), quashed, 233 So.2d 381
(Fla. 1970).
60. Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 129, 42 N.W.2d 500, 503 (1950).
61. Id. at 125, 42 N.W.2d at 504 (1950).
62. See Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
63. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722, 7 So.2d 9 (1942).
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holding that alimony provisions in antenuptial contracts are void, while
such provisions may receive judicial affirmation in postnuptial agreements.
D. Alimony Versus Property Settlement
There is a basic ambiguity in the application of the public policy rule
which permeates the entire area of divorce. This ambiguity consists of the
differentiation between support or alimony, and property settlement. So
pronounced is this ambiguity in the area of antenuptial contracts that the
distinction between property settlement and alimony is difficult to make.
If an antenuptial contract settles the division of property between spouses
in the event of divorce, is it invalid under the public policy rule? Although
the answer to this question is not free from doubt, the majority of courts
that apply the public policy rule will void provisions regarding both alimony and property settlement.
The confusion in this area had an early beginning. In an 1896 Supreme Court of Kansas case, 4 an antenuptial contract provided that upon
divorce there was to be no alimony and no right to the property of the
other spouse. The court held that because this contract waived the husband's duty to support the wife, it was void. The court decreed that the
wife should receive $1,770 in cash and 120 acres of the husband's property, without discussing the validity of the portion of the agreement dealing with property settlement. By failing to define clearly the award as
alimony or alimony plus a property settlement, the court impliedly held
the provision was void without attempting to classify it. This lack of
clarity allowed later courts to hold that an antenuptial contract, whether
it provides for alimony and/or property settlement upon divorce, was
void as against public policy. Thus, many of the problems involving alimony and property settlements have stemmed from what the courts have
failed to say rather than from what they have said.
Some courts have added to the uncertainty by their broad application of the public policy rule. One such court, when voiding an antenuptial
contract containing both alimony and property settlement provisions,
held: " [I] t is the rule in this court that an antenuptial contract which purports to limit the husband's liability in the event of separation or divorce
is void as against public policy."6 5 However, the court failed to discuss
any distinctions between alimony and property settlement provisions.
The contract in dispute provided that upon divorce, the wife would receive
$2,500 as a final division of the estate in lieu of alimony. The same provision was made in the event the husband died. The court gave the wife
$100 per month alimony and $20,184.47, partially representing a "distribution of a share of property," 6 ° notwithstanding the husband's argument
that the contract, even though void as to alimony, should have been valid
64. Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507, 44 P. 1 (1896).
65. Werlein v. Werlein, 27 Wis. 2d 237, 240, 133 N.W.2d 820, 822 (1965)
added).
66. Id. at 238, 133 N.W.2d at 821.

(emphasis
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as to the property settlement. Thus, the court at least impliedly held that
an antenuptial contract, whether limiting alimony or stipulating property
settlement, was void when tested by the public policy rule.
Other courts have engendered uncertainty by using the public policy
rule to support the theory that prospective spouses have no right to even
contemplate divorce in a contract. This approach has been used in those
decisions which hold that, under the public policy rule, any antenuptial
contract is void which "facilitates or otherwise contemplates ... divorce
or separation. ' 6 7 Under the broad scope of the word "contemplate," courts
have treated alimony and property settlement provisions alike when found
within an antenuptial contract.6 This same treatment for alimony and
property settlement provisions is further complicated by such broad
statements of the public policy rule as:
Antenuptial contracts, to be valid, must be made in contemplation of the marriage relation subsisting until the parties are
separated by death .... If such an agreement is made in contemplation, at the time of its execution, that the parties, or either of
them, expect to be divorced, then such an agreement is void ab
initio.6 9
It should be noted that much of the uncertainty in this area seems to
be inherent in antenuptual contracts. These agreements lend themselves to
the lack of differentiation in judicial treatment that is accorded alimony
and property settlement provisions. Generally, the provisions stipulating
alimony and property division are so interconnected that it is usually
simpler to void the entire agreement than to recognize any distinction between the provisions. For example, antenuptial contracts often state that
if there is a divorce, the wife is to receive a set payment in lieu of alimony
and all rights in the husband's property. Separating these two provisions
and determining their legal effect is obviously difficult. With this difficulty
in mind, it might be argued that an antenuptial contract can easily receive
judicial approval if it deals only with the property settlement and refrains
from any mention of alimony. However, antenuptial contracts consisting
solely of a provision governing the division of property upon divorce are
rare. In Sanders v. Sanders," the Supreme Court of Tennessee was asked
to enforce an antenuptial contract which provided that if either spouse
filed for divorce, he or she forfeited all his rights in the marital property.
While the Sanders court was presented with the opportunity to resolve
the ambiguities surrounding the waiver of support as opposed to property
settlements in antenuptial agreements, the court avoided clarification.
Rather than upholding the clause waiving property rights upon divorce,
the court further clouded the issue by deciding that the provision was
67.
68.
69.
70.

Annot., 70 A.L.R. 826, 826 (1931) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928).
Id. at 625, 7 S.W.2d at 788.
40 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (1956).
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valid only as to a spouse who files for divorce upon unreasonable grounds
and in bad faith. In addition, Sanders leaves unanswered the question of
what judicial treatment will be given an antenuptial contract which sets
certain property rights upon divorce regardless of who the complaining
spouse might be. Likewise, the decision implies that if an antenuptial
contract provides for waiver of property rights by the spouse filing for
divorce, and if that spouse does file in good faith, then such a contract is
void.
While there have been cases which imply that an antenuptial property settlement provision should be enforced upon divorce, these decisions
are also plagued by what the courts fail to say rather than by what they
actually hold. In Williams v. Williams,7 ' for example, the court was faced
'vith an antenuptial contract providing that upon divorce the husband
was to pay the wife $500 in settlement of all claims and demands. The
court held that this provision was contrary to public policy insofar as the
support was concerned. Apparently the issue of alimony was the sole
question before the court. However, by way of dictum, the court said: "It
[the antenuptial contract] may be . . . perfectly valid in settling any

rights which [the wife] acquired in the separate property of [the husband] by reason of the marriage." 72 The court in Williams failed to
73
elaborate on this statement, however. Another case, Motley v. Motley,
also hinted that property settlement provisions should be upheld in antenuptial contracts contingent upon divorce. Motley involved an antenuptial
contract in which the wife waived all alimony and support upon divorce.
Although no property settlement was involved, the court, in voiding the
agreement, stated: "The antenuptial agreement relied upon by the defendant [husband] herein is against public policy and is null and void in so
far as it undertakes to relieve the defendant from the duty of supporting
the plaintiff [wife].",, This language implied that had the contract dealt
with property division, it would have been upheld. However, the full
text of the contract did not appear in the opinion and, in its absence, one
could not determine whether any of its provisions concerned property
division.
The state courts of Wisconsin appear to have rendered the clearest
decisions in this area. Wisconsin's position is that the public policy rule
should be applied to any antenuptial contract contingent upon divorce
regardless of whether it involves alimony or property settlement. The
first case to authoritatively establish this as the rule in Wisconsin was
Fricke v. Fricke.7" The court in Fricke was asked to enforce an antenuptial contract calling for $2,000 to be paid to the wife upon divorce as
a property settlement in lieu of alimony. In holding this contract void
71. 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926).

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 544, 243 P. at 404.
255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961).
Id. at 193, 120 S.E.2d at 424.
257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
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under the public policy rule, the court stated: "An antenuptial contract
which purports to limit the husband's liability in the event of separation or

divorce . . . is void as against public policy.""6 The court remanded the

case with directions that the lower court decide the wife's alimony and
divide the property. The court had thus interpreted the phrase "husband's
liability" in the above rule to encompass both alimony and property
settlement.
Eight years later the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed its application of the public policy rule in Fricke. In Caldwell v. Caldwell,77
the defendant husband asked the court to adopt the dissenting opinion in
Fricke repudiating the public policy rule. While refusing to abandon the
rule, the court did observe that "[w]hile some members of the court as
now constituted would prefer the views expressed in the dissent [in
Fricke] if the matter were an original proposition, we do not consider
ourselves at liberty to reject the considered decision of our predecessors
M8 Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found itself chained by
....
precedent. As late as 1967, the courts of Wisconsin made it clear that
whether the contract deals with alimony or property settlement it will
be voided under the public policy rule. In Strandberg v. Strandberg,79 the
court, citing the Fricke decision, said the rule in Wisconsin was that "an
antenuptial agreement is against public policy and void in respect to a
division of estates in the event of divorce or legal separation . .

..

o

There has been a good deal of antenuptial contract litigation in Kansas, a state which has attempted to distinguish support and property provisions within antenuptial contracts. Despite its attempts, Kansas'
decisions regarding antenuptial contracts still contain uncertainties and
ambiguities. For example, in Fincham v. Fincham,81 the court had before
it an antenuptial contract providing that if the husband and wife separated, the husband was to pay the wife $2,000 in complete settlement of
every claim the wife might have against the husband by reason of the
marriage. The agreement further stipulated that the agreement should
be accepted by any court as a full and complete settlement and satisfaction of the property rights of the husband and wife. The contract ended
with a provision that all rights the wife might have in the husband's
property were to be extinguished upon payment of the $2,000. In response
to the presentation of the above agreement, the court said that the rule in
Kansas was:
"[C]ontracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose
76. Id. at 129, 42 N.W.2d at 502. The dissent argued that the public policy rule should
be abandoned in favor of approaching each antenuptial contract on a fact by fact basis.
See also Werlein v. Werlein, 27 Wis. 2d 237, 133 N.W.2d 820 (1965).
77. 5 Wis. 2d 146, 92 N..2d 356 (1958).
78. Id. at 156, 92 N.W.2d at 361.
79. 33 Wis. 2d 204, 147 N.W.2d 349 (1967).
80. Id. at 207, 147 N.W.2d at 351.
81. 160 Kan. 683, 165 P.2d 209 (1946).
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of which is to fix property rights between a husband and wife,
are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the
makers, and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and
understandably made, are just and equitable in their provisions
and are not obtained by fraud or overreaching. . . ." [S]uch
contracts are not against public policy unless the terms of the
contract encourage a separation of the parties. 2
Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court, at least ostensibly, had abandoned
the public policy rule in favor of judging the antenuptial contract dealing
with property settlement under a two-pronged test: (1) A fair, just and
equitable agreement which is not obtained by fraud or misunderstanding;
and (2) an agreement that does not encourage the separation of the
parties.
After stating its test, the court in Fincham proceeded to void the
contract in question because it encouraged separation. The pronounced
theory was that inevitably the husband would have realized that he could
dispense with his marriage at the cost of only $2,000. This reasoning
points to one of the principal problems with the Fincham test. It would
be an insurmountable challenge to draft an antenuptial contract settling
property rights in such terms that it would not be profitable, in a pecuniary sense, for one spouse or the other to seek a divorce. Practically every
conceivable antenuptial contract looking toward financial settlement
would, in this sense, encourage divorce. The test of determining what encourages divorce echoes the sentiments of the Kansas Supreme Court
which, as early as 1896, stated that such encouragement is present if the
provision makes it "productive of profit to the party having the greater
amount of property.""3 The only way that a prospective couple can meet
the Fincham test is to strike upon some mysterious formula that would
divide their property just as the divorce court would divide it. Since compliance with this test can never practicably be achieved, the effect of
Finckam is just another application of the public policy rule voiding
all antenuptial contracts contingent upon divorce. This evaluation of
Fincham has found support from at least one writer:
[S]ince society has a vital interest in the preservation of marriage, any antenuptial bargain that looks toward, provides for,
facilitates, or tends to induce a separation or divorce after marriage, is contrary to public policy and void. Thus any provision
in an antenuptial agreement for alimony or a property settlement in case the marriage breaks up is unenforceable.84
Another difficulty with Fincham is that the antenuptial contract in
82. Id. at 687, 165 P.2d at 212, quoting In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546, 551, 119
P.2d 483, 486 (1941).
83. Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507, 512, 44 P. 1, 2 (1896).
84. 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS 90-27 (1964)
(emphasis added).
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question there made no mention of waiver of support. Throughout
two-thirds of the opinion, the court wrote as though it were formulating
a test for the validity of an antenuptial contract regulating the division of
property upon divorce. However, in applying the "fair and equitable"
portion of its test, the court allowed the old ambiguity between support
and property settlement to undermine what had begun as a bold step in
the right direction: "Moreover, if the separation provision is declared to
be valid he may without just cause abandon her and for the wholly inadequate sum of $2000 relieve himself of his personal marital duty to...
support and maintain her .... ,,s5 Thus, by means of this unnecessary dictum, the court allowed the question of alimony to cloud the resolution of
solely a property settlement issue.
A final problem with Fincham is that, in support of its holding making the public policy rule inapplicable to antenuptial contracts stipulating
inter-spousal property rights upon divorce, the court referred to a collection of eleven cases. However, these cases did not support Fincham's
holding, since they all dealt with antenuptial contracts concerning property settlements upon death, and not with antenuptial contracts relating to
property settlements upon divorce. This distinction is important because
practically every jurisdiction has held antenuptial contracts settling
property rights upon death valid if fair, equitable and free from fraud,
while denying validity to those same contracts if they are contingent upon
divorce. Thus, the Kansas court, despite its attempt to do otherwise, developed a test unsupported by precedent and which reaffirmed the age-old
public policy rule. What promised to be an answer to the confusion in
antenuptial contract law between support and property settlement simply
missed its mark.
The chief difficulty with the Fincham holding was recently pointed
out in In re Cooper's Estate.8' There the judge made the following observation about the Fincham test: "The difficulty which arises in connection
with the application of the foregoing rule is when an agreement can be
said to invite, facilitate, or encourage divorce. ' 1 7 The court in Cooper
recognized the difficulty in answering this question and pointed to at least
two instances in which antenuptial contracts definitely encouraged divorce: (1) when the agreement obligated one spouse not to defend or
contest a divorce suit by the other spouse; and (2) when the agreement
obligated one spouse to sue for or procure a divorce. If there are ever any
instances which would justify application of the public policy rule, these
two hypothetical provisions constitute such instances.
Discussion of the public policy rule would be incomplete without
suggesting a solution for the problems presented by the rule. The first step
is for a judicial review of the policy behind the public policy rule. If the
85. 160 Kan. at 689, 165 P.2d at 213.
86. 195 Kan. 174, 403 P.2d 984 (1965).
87. Id. at 180, 403 P.2d at 988.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

policy is simply that parties should not take upon themselves the prerogative of equity and agree to any settlement contingent upon divorce,
then the application of the rule to antenuptial contracts settling property
rights upon divorce is correct. However, if the policy is to adequately
provide for divorced women, then courts should recognize that agreements
as to alimony and those as to property right should be treated differently.
If the courts must adhere to the public policy rule, then it should be applied only to alimony agreements with divorce as a contingency. When
prospective spouses agree upon division or waiver of property in the event
of divorce, this agreement should not be automatically voided. The agreement should be upheld if it meets the test of good faith and full disclosure
applied to similar property agreements that are contingent upon death.88
It should be recognized that the basic difficulty with the application
of the above approach is that few antenuptial contracts deal solely with
property division upon divorce. Thus, the question is immediately encountered as to how the courts will approach the following antenuptial
contract clause: "In the event of divorce the husband will give the wife
$500 in full satisfaction of all her rights to alimony and in lieu of any
rights to the husband's separate property." As the majority of courts now
stand, this entire agreement would automatically be voided. However,
if the alimony and property division provisions can be distinguished, the
agreement presents a definite problem. One solution, assuming that
spouses cannot contract as to alimony, would be to void the alimony provision and enforce the property rights provision by giving the wife a $250
lien on the husband's separate property, provided there was no fraud in
the execution of the agreement. If the foregoing agreement provides for
$500 in alimony and no property rights for the wife, then the husband
could, in the absence of fraud, enforce the waiver of property rights provision to prevent the wife from receiving any portion of the husband's
separate property.
In addition to the wording of a particular antenuptial contract, there
is another problem inherent in the recognition or non-recognition of these
agreements. Due to the broad powers of equity courts in this area, usually
by statute, a court can order a'transfer of property from the husband to
the wife in lieu of alimony.89 Furthermore, as a practical matter, the
divorce decree often does not clearly differentiate between property
division and support. 9° Thus, even if the public policy rule is abandoned
as it applies to property division agreements contingent upon divorce, an
equity court would still have the power to circumvent this approach by
simply disguising property division in the form of alimony.
The foregoing problems are reasons why the courts should abandon
the public policy rule as to both alimony and property division provisions.
88. See section IV, B, infra.
89. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 449 (1968).
90. See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS
(1966).
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The courts should allow such provisions, subject only to the test of whether
the provision for the wife is fair; and if not fair, whether there is fraud,
misrepresentation or overreaching by the husband.
E. The Movement Away from the Public Policy Rule
The next consideration is the movement away from the rule that
any antenuptial contract determining rights upon divorce is void per se as
against public policy. It should be recognized at the outset, however, that
some courts refuse to even reexamine the rule, much less overrule it.9
Only one case, Hudson v. Hudson,92 squarely upholds an antenuptial
agreement providing for no alimony upon divorce, thereby completely disregarding the public policy rule. However, the court's reasoning in Hudson
has not been followed by any other court, including those in the same
jurisdiction. The failure to adopt Hudson's reasoning indicates that the
public policy rule will not be directly overruled.9" Rather, as judicial nonacceptance of Hudson illustrates, the public policy rule can only be
changed by a more indirect approach.
The first decision to pierce the public policy rule was Sanders v. Sanders.94 In Sanders, an antenuptial contract provided that if either spouse
filed for a divorce, he or she forfeited all interest in the marital property.
The most promising part of the Sanders decision was the court's apparent
refusal to automatically apply the public policy rule without first weighing the facts and circumstances. The court viewed its job as having "to
determine whether it [the antenuptial contract] violates the public policy
rule. To do this, it is proper to consider the purposes of the contract, and
the situation of the parties when it was made." 95 These were encouraging
words to bolster the assault on the public policy rule. However, the Sanders court neither upheld the contract nor voided it. Rather, the court
looked at "the intention of the parties" and held that the parties actually
intended the agreement to be enforceable only if the divorce was not
prosecuted in good faith and upon reasonable grounds. The court drew an
analogy between the divorce provision and a will provision denying benefits to one who contests the will. The rule in that situation provided that
the forfeiture provision was valid only as to one who contested in bad
faith and with unreasonable justification.9" The limited scope of Sanders,
therefore, was that if there was an antenuptial agreement waiving property rights contingent upon divorce, the agreement would only be effective
if the divorce action was prosecuted in bad faith. The importance of
Sanders lay not in its substantive outcome, but rather in the fact that it
91. See, e.g., Werlein v. Werlein, 27 Wis. 2d 237, 133 N.W.2d 820 (1965).
92. 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).

93. See Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970). The court took special effort
to point out that Hudson did not overrule the public policy rule but only ignored it.
94. 40 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (1955).

95. Id. at 33, 288 S.W.2d at 478.
96. See 57 AM. JuR. Wills § 515 (1948).
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provided a precedent upon which it could be argued that an antenuptial
contract dealing with divorce rights was not automatically void.
The most consistent and dramatic judicial departure from the public policy rule has come in the State of Florida, where antenuptial contract litigation has sharply increased in recent years.9 7 The pioneer case
which served as the point of departure from the public policy rule was
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio. 8 It is odd that Del Vecchio should be the
leading case in this area, since the suit involved an antenuptial contract
death provision and had absolutely nothing to do with divorce rights.
However, the importance of the case was in the test which the court formulated. For an antenuptial contract to be upheld, one of the following
three alternative requirements has to be met: (1) a fair and reasonable
provision for the wife; (2) a full and frank disclosure to the wife of the
husband's worth before signing the agreement; or (3) a general and approximate knowledge by the wife of the prospective husband's property.
In actuality, Del Vecchio simply restated the long applied test as to antenuptial contracts contingent upon death. Nevertheless, Del Vecchio assumed great importance, not because of what the court held, but rather
because of what later courts have construed the opinion to mean. If the
Del Vecchio court still approved of application of the public policy rule
to antenuptial contracts stipulating divorce rights, then it should have
made this view more explicit, because a subsequent Florida decision,
Lindsay v. Lindsay, interpreted Del Vecchio to mean that "by implication . . . the parties may contractually determine alimony provisions in
the event of separation or divorce . . .,99
Although Lindsay justifiably strikes a blow at the obsolete public
policy rule, it is submitted that Lindsay misinterpreted the Del Vecchio
decision. In reaching its decision, the court in Lindsay relied on the following statement in Del Vecchio: "The basic criterion is . . . whether the
provisions made for the wife will enable her to live after the dissolution
of the marriage ties in a manner reasonably consonant with her way
of life before dissolution . . . ."I" The Lindsay court held that this language implied that parties can prenuptially stipulate divorce rights. However, there was nothing in Del Vecchio to suggest that the words "dissolution of the marriage ties" meant anything other than dissolution by death.
Writing four years after Lindsay, one of the concurring judges conceded
that the implication drawn by Lindsay was incorrect and that a husband
and wife could not antenuptially contract as to alimony. 01' However, the
Florida movement away from the public policy rule had gone too far to
97. See Murray, Family Law, 1961-1962 Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MAw_ L. REv.
231, 251 (1963) (four-fold increase over a two year period).
98. 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
99. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 163 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
100. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962).
101. Posner v. Posner, 206 So.2d 416, 419 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), quashed, 233 So.2d 381
(Fla. 1970).
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be stopped by a realization, four years too late, that the courts had started
the movement via a judicial error.
There is another difficulty with Lindsay which needs examination.
In referring to Del Vecchio, the court in Lindsay stated:
By implication, the opinion holds that the parties may contractually determine alimony provisions in the event of separation or
divorce, but the case does not decide the question of the validity
of an ante-nuptial agreement wherein the future wife waives
her right
to alimony, support . . . and receives nothing in re02
turn.1
Upon the basis of this statement, it is submitted that the rule of Lindsay
is that a husband and wife can antenuptially contract as to alimony upon
divorce if the agreement meets the three alternative criteria of Del Vecchio, but they cannot antenuptially contract the complete waiver of alimony by the wife. Under the Lindsay decision, an antenuptial contract
whereby the husband is to pay the wife $10 per month alimony could be
valid if it meets the requirements of the Del Vecchio test. However, if the
antenuptial contract provides that the husband is to pay the wife no alimony, then the provision would be automatically void under the public
policy rule. There seems to be no justification for such a distinction.
The next step in the Florida departure from the public policy rule
came in Sack v. Sack.10 3 In Sack, the antenuptial contract provided that,
in the event of divorce, "$1.00 shall be accepted by him or her in full
settlement of all rights including rights of alimony, support and maintenance."' 1 4 Thus, the stage was set for the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, to lay to rest the uncertainty surrounding its decision in Lindsay.
However, the lower court, instead of ruling on the divorce, improperly
annulled the marriage. The Sack court seized upon the chancellor's error
to remand the case and, thereby, avoided ruling upon the validity of the
antenuptial contract provision. In remanding the case, however, the court
sounded the death knell for the public policy rule: "If following remand
of the cause the chancellor grants the husband a decree of divorce, then
the question of validity of the contract . . . should be measured by the
10 5
chancellor under the rule announced in... Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio.'
Thus, Sack was the first clear statement that an antenuptial contract regarding divorce was not automatically void but was to be judged on the
basis of a three-alternative-criteria test.1 6
The final phase of the Florida story was a case which began its
litigious course before 1968 and in 1970 received the final word of the
102. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 163 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
103. 184 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
104. Id. at 435.
105. Id.
106. (1) fair and reasonable provision for the wife; (2) full disclosure to the wife
of the husband's worth; or (3) general knowledge by the wife of the prospective husband's
worth.
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Supreme Court of Florida. Posner v. Posner10 7 involved the validity
of an antenuptial contract providing that, in the event of divorce, the
husband was to pay the wife $600 per month in lieu of alimony and support. In the first appellate review of this case, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, was faced with the challenge of finally resolving the
controversy. While the district court held that the contract was not binding, the strength of the decision was weakened by the variance among the
members of the court as to what theory should be used in deciding the
case. The majority concluded that the agreement was not binding, basing
its position upon the theory that the awarding of alimony was within the
sole and complete discretion of the chancellor, thus excluding the private
agreement. The concurring opinion vigorously restated the old public
policy rule. The concurring judge, contrary to the majority, believed that
the court could make no election as to whether it would accept or reject
the contract-it had to reject it. Finally, the dissenting judge mustered
all of the arguments against the public policy rule to plead for its abandonment and for judicial enforcement of contracts that meet the Del
Vecchio test.
Thus, the stage was finally set for the resolution of this issue by the
Supreme Court of Florida. After giving judicial recognition to the timehonored public policy rule, the supreme court noted a change in both the
attitude and habit of society reflecting the theory that divorce ought to
be attained more freely or, at least, that the parties ought to be allowed
to provide for such a contingency. Having recognized the need for a new
test to judge antenuptial contracts dealing with divorce, the court held
that an antenuptial contract regulating divorce rights is valid if it meets
one of the three criteria of the Del Vecchio test, and if it appears that
the divorce is prosecuted in good faith and on proper grounds. 08 The requirement of proper grounds appears not to refer to cases where a spouse
sues for divorce and cannot prove his grounds, but rather to cases where
the parties have contractually agreed that one will file for divorce upon an
agreed ground, or that one spouse will not contest the divorce. Finally,
the court further qualified its test by saying that the contract is valid only
as long as conditions existing at the time the contract was made remain
unchanged. Thus, it is always within the court's power to alter the terms
of the contract upon a showing of changed circumstances.'0 O
The question left unanswered by Posner is whether, by antenuptial
contract, a wife can waive all rights to alimony. Under the rule of Del
Vecchio, it would appear that she can; however, the decision in Lindsay
107. 206 So.2d 416 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), quashed, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
108. Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970). [Subsequent to the preparation of

this article, Posner was again before the Supreme Court of Florida. This time, the court
invalidated the alimony provisions of the antenuptial agreement on the grounds that the
husband concealed his true net worth at the time the agreement was executed. Posner v.
Posner, 257 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1972).].

109. This is analogous to modification

(1971).

of alimony decrees. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14
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seems to indicate that the wife must receive something in return. In addition, the judicial power recognized in Posner of increasing or decreasing the alimony provision for the wife implies that she must be given
some alimony. Thus, even under the new test announced in Posner, a wife
would be unable to contractually waive all her rights to alimony. If the
agreement complies with the Del Vecchio test, there appears to be no reason to invalidate it regardless of whatever provisions are made for the
wife.
IV.

STIPULATING RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES UPON DEATH
VIA THE ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT

The test used by the Florida courts to judge the validity of antenuptial contracts governing alimony is derived from the test applied by the
majority of American courts to antenuptial contracts contingent upon
death. The question remaining to be answered is how other jurisdictions
will apply Florida's test regarding alimony if, in fact, they decide to adopt
it. In determining how to apply the test, it is probable that the courts
will observe its application to antenuptial contracts contingent upon death.
Therefore, an analysis of the alteration of inter-spousal property rights
upon death is necessary. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold: (1) To
identify the rules governing the enforceability of these contracts; and (2)
to determine any errors which the courts have made in this area, in order
that courts will be able to avoid these pitfalls when applying this test to
contracts altering inter-spousal rights upon divorce.
All is prepared for sealing and for signing,
The contract has been drafted as agreed;
Approach the table, oh, ye lovers pining,
With hand and seal come execute the deed!110
The above legal aphorism presents a vivid picture of the execution
of the antenuptial contract. The question is whether this portrait of two
pining lovers, a scene foremost in the minds of judges operating in this
area, is factual and valid today. The answer to this inquiry demands an
examination of historical attitudes toward engaged parties to determine
the true relationship between prospective spouses who are about to enter
into an antenuptial contract.
In viewing antenuptial contracts which provide for the settlement of
property rights upon death, courts invariably have begun with the realization that between persons in the premartimonial state there is a mystical,
confidential relationship which anesthetizes the senses of the female partner. This confidential relationship attained its most dramatic expression
in a nineteenth century Ohio decision in which the chancellor remarked:
"What person so exposed to imposition as a woman, contracting personally with her intended husband, just on the eve of marriage, at a time
110. Alpert, Gilbert's Law, 75 CASE & COM. 44 (1970)

(emphasis added).
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when all prudential considerations are likely to be merged in a confiding
attachment . . ."' Having recognized the mental frailty of the infatuated woman, the courts have become her self-proclaimed protector whenever a prospective husband has attempted to alter her property rights.
In view of the confidential relationship that is said to exist, the courts
have imposed special duties upon, and presumptions against, the prospective bridegroom in his attempt to alter the property rights of his intended
spouse. Before discussing these duties and presumptions, however, an
examination of this so-called confidential relationship will be made to determine: (1) whether such a relationship realistically exists today; (2)
assuming that it does exist, at what point it develops during the premarital
relationship; and (3) what effect, if any, its existence should have upon
the rules governing the recognition and enforcement of antenuptial contracts.
A.

The Confidential Relationship

The confidential relationship doctrine requires the prospective husband
to make full disclosure to his future wife of his assets and income. The
policy justification for the doctrine is that a ruthless husband will have
his prospective wife under such mental control that he will use this confidential relationship to dupe her into foregoing property rights incidental
to the marriage.
In deciding whether this confidential relationship exists, the courts
take basically three approaches. The older and more popular view is that
this relationship exists between any two parties who are about to be married. 1 2 This approach can be termed a "confidential relationship by presumption." Courts adopting this approach apply it as an irrebuttable presumption, but in order to do so one must insulate himself from those fact
situations wherein the prospective spouses are marrying solely for companionship. The presumption ignores those marriage arrangements in
which the parties have full knowledge of what they desire from the other's
estate and are far from being infatuated with each other. Thus, by invoking this presumption, the courts are ignoring the differences created
by individual fact situations. While the presumption of a confidential
relationship is definite and predictable, it is at the same time too indiscriminate in its automatic imposition of the confidential relationship
burdens upon all who contemplate marriage.
A second approach used by courts can be termed a "confidential relationship by engagement." Courts employing this approach attempt to
distinguish between premarital relationships which involve infatuation
and more practical relationships by creating a presumption that a confidential relationship comes into existence upon the engagement of the par111. Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610, 614 (1846).
112. See, e.g., Potter v. Potter, 234 Ky. 769, 29 S.W.2d 15 (1930) ; Hartz v. Hartz,
248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967).
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ties."' This is an attempt to improve upon the older, more rigid approach
by recognizing that there is no confidential relationship between some espoused parties. However, the apparent improvement is based upon the
erroneous reasoning that the relationship between espoused parties becomes confidential after engagement but not before. In other words,
these courts recognize that there is no confidential relationship between
parties who are not engaged. The effect of this approach is that the prospective spouse who persuades his marriage partner to contract prior to
engagement avoids the consequences of the confidential relationship doctrine, while he who waits until after engagement is not so fortunate. In
all probability, this approach originated at a time when an engagement,
at least in the minds of most people, indicated an increased dependency
between the prospective spouses. While such a presumption may have
been valid at an earlier time, today it is anomalous to say that before a
couple becomes engaged they deal with each other as strangers, but that
after becoming engaged a confidential relationship automatically exists
between them.
Another problem with this approach is deciding when an engagement
occurs. Undoubtedly the moment of engagement was more identifiable at
an earlier time in our society when it was accomplished by some overt
act such as the gift of a ring, the presentation of a gift to show good faith,
or the request of parental permission. However, in today's society, the
essential acts which constitute an engagement are not so formalized and
readily cognizable. This difficulty is reflected by the decisions of those
courts which have sought to apply the theory that a confidential relationship exists after engagement. These courts have failed to present any
adequate or comprehensive definition of when an engagement takes place.
In fact, the majority of these courts have merely assumed that engagement was present." 4 One reason may account for this assumption and
the resulting silence as to what constitutes an engagement. The question
of the existence of an engagement has been traditionally viewed as a
question of fact. Consequently, the resolution of this issue was within
the authority of the trial courts. Although this procedure may have been
quite proper, prospective couples who desired to contract before engagement were left in an uncertain legal position because reported appellate
cases gave no guidelines or tests as to when an engagement occurred.
The only consistent attempt to resolve the problem of identifying
an engagement has been made in Illinois and with little resulting success
in terms of definiteness, clarity and predictability. In one of the earliest
113. See, e.g., Martin v. Collison, 266 Ill. 172, 107 N.E. 257 (1914). In In re McClellan's
Estate, 365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950), the husband was eighty and the wife fifty-eight
but the court still held that a confidential relationship came into existence automatically
upon engagement.
114. See, e.g., Dennison v. Dawes, 121 Me. 402, 117 A. 314 (1922) ; Bauer v. Bauer,
1 Ore. App. 504, 464 P.2d 710 (1970) ; Newton v. Pickell, 201 Ore. 238, 269 P.2d 508 (1954) ;
Lightman v. Magid, 54 Tenn. App. 701, 394 S.W.2d 151 (1965); Batleman v. Rubin, 199
Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957).
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cases, a marriage agreement was held to constitute an engagement." 5
Apparently, the Illinois court envisioned an agreement prior to the antenuptial contract as the act signifying engagement. Furthermore, before
any confidential relationship could be presumed, the wife had to prove
that there was an antenuptial agreement to marry. Although this test was
quite clear in determining the existence of an engagement, it has been
almost completely discarded by later Illinois cases." 6
Although the majority of the applicable Illinois decisions have been
consistent in holding that engagement is always more than the mere contemplation of marriage, the latest decision was completely contrary. After
affirming the general rule that mere contemplation of marriage is not sufficient, the court in Watson v. Watson" 7 held that the following facts constituted an engagement: (1) a statement by a friend that prior to the
execution of the antenuptial contract the prospective bridegroom had requested his presence at the wedding and (2) a provision in the antenuptial contract that the parties contemplated a marriage ceremony soon to be
solemnized." 8 Thus, the Illinois courts have been confused and uncertain
as to when an engagement arises, simply because they have been attempting to give a legal definition to an occurrence in human affairs which
defies precise identification.
The third approach used to determine when a confidential relationship exists can be called a "confidential relationship by facts." While the
automatic presumption of a confidential relationship is predictable in its
application, determining confidentiality by factual analysis is admittedly
imprecise. Perhaps the best expression of the theory behind the factual
approach is that "[e]ach case involving an antenuptial agreement differs
from every other case and each case must be decided upon its own particular facts.""' 9 However, courts vary in determining what facts are
sufficient to negate any confidential relationship between prospective
spouses. Some courts refuse to recognize any confidential relationship when
there is no love between the parties. This lack of love may manifest itself
in facts ranging from an overt statement by the woman that she does not
love the man 2 ° to circumstances from which it can be inferred that the
parties entered the marital state as a matter of convenience.' 2 ' Other
courts make the existence of the confidential relationship dependent upon
the ages of the parties. Some courts, for example, more readily declare a
confidential relationship when the prospective husband is much older than
172, 107 N.E. 257 (1914).
115. Martin v. Collison, 266 Ill.
116. See, e.g., Yockey v. Marion, 269 Ill. 342, 110 N.E. 34 (1915) ; Petru v. Petru,
App. 2d 1, 123 N.E.2d 352 (1954).
4 Ill.
117. 5 Ill. 2d 526, 126 N.E.2d 220 (1955).
118. An earlier decision had stated that such a statement in the antenuptial contract
342, 110 N.E. 34 (1915).
is not evidence of engagement. Yockey v. Marion, 269 Ill.
119. In re Koeffler, 215 Wis. 115, 120, 254 N.W. 363, 368 (1934).
120. See Rocker v. Rocker, 13 Ohio Misc. 199, 232 N.E.2d 445 (1967).
121. See In re Malchow, 143 Minn. 53, 172 N.W. 915 (1919).
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the intended bride.22 while others, employing the concept of absolute age,
are more apt to find the existence of a confidential relationship between a
young couple than between a couple past middle age.' 23
All of the foregoing approaches as to what constitutes a confidential
relationship are either needlessly rigid or are too dependent on individual
fact situations at the cost of definiteness and predictability. The question
left unanswered is whether these extremes can be avoided by the use of
an approach which provides for both considerations equally. The courts
should consider whether the confidential relationship doctrine actually
serves any useful function today and, if it does, whether its advantages
outweigh its disadvantages. Sustained thought about the reasoning behind
the confidential relationship doctrine raises serious doubts as to its soundness. Unfairness can exist and disadvantages can occur with or without a
confidential relationship. The uninfatuated woman, as well as the infatuated
woman, may become the victim of overt fraud and misrepresentation. An
even greater difficulty with the confidential relationship doctrine is that
it involves an attempt to identify a state of mind and to apply rules of
law based upon that identification. The division among the courts applying the doctrine seems to affirm that such an identification is beyond any
court's ability.
Lastly, the idea of a confidential relationship in which the prospective husband has hypnotic power over his future wife is an unrealistic
picture of today's premarital relationship. This observation is especially
true among those people past middle age who utilize the antenuptial contract more than any other age group.'24
B.

Good Faith and Full Disclosure-Benefits for the Bride
and Burdens for the Groom
The courts agree on the premise that "when an antenuptial contract
is entered into ...

it is required of each [as a result of the confidential

relationship] to make a frank, full, and truthful disclosure of their respective worth in real as well as personal property."' 2 5 This judicial

agreement leads to the assumption that, contrary to judicial reality, the
burdens of the confidential relationship are applied equally to the prospective husband and the prospective wife.
One author, commenting upon antenuptial contract litigation in
Illinois, has observed:
122. E.g., Slingerland v. Slingerland, 115 Minn. 270, 132 N.W. 326 (1911)

(prospective

husband was sixty-seven and bride was twenty-three).
123. See, e.g., Daniels v. Banister, 146 Ky. 48, 141 S.W. 393 (1911) (bridegroom sixtythree and bride fifty-nine--no confidential relationship). See also In re Groff, 341 Pa. 105,
111, 19 A.2d 107, 110 (1941), where both parties were past middle age and the court,
holding no confidential relationship existed, remarked: "There is a marked distinction
between a case like the present and that of a young couple just entering upon the vogage
of life."
124. See Appendix A infra.
125. Levy v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63, 73, 43 A.2d 25, 29 (1945) (emphasis added).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

It is a matter of great gratification to me to find that there is no
reported case in Illinois in which a husband contested the validity of an antenuptial agreement, which I believe is quite in keeping with the best tradition of men of Illinois. There are two
conclusions that might be drawn therefrom, namely, (1) that
the men of Illinois act with unswerving fidelity and loyalty to
their wives and refuse to dispute with them even after they have
departed this mortal world; or (2) the men of Illinois, after entering into a antenuptial agreement, deem it prophetically prudent to predecease their wives. 26
With all due regard for the chivalry of Illinois men, other and more important conclusions may be drawn from the fact that cases in which the
husband contests the antenuptial contract are practically nonexistent.
One such conclusion is that women tend to live longer than men. Another
is that many antenuptial contracts lack reciprocity, i.e., the wife waives
rights in the husband's estate but he does not waive his rights in her
estate.
However, it is suggested that there is an important conclusion to be
drawn from the fact that few husbands contest the antenuptial contract.
This hesitation of husbands to contest the contract may be due, not to
virtue and respect for deceased wives, but to the courts' placing a greater
burden of proof upon the contesting husband than upon the wife.
Although the duties of good faith and full disclosure are upon both parties, litigation reveals that these duties weigh more heavily upon the bridegroom than upon the bride. Even Professor Lindey, a noted authority on
the subject, admits that the cases are not at all clear as to whether the
fiduciary duty is mutual or unilateral.'2 7
The first instance of inequality and unfairness in this area arises
from the courts' recognition of a presumption in favor of the contesting
wife. If the wife waives all her property rights in the contract or if the
provision for her is inequitable, unjust, or unreasonable, then a presumption of fraud or nondisclosure arises. It then becomes the burden of the
deceased husband's heirs to prove that there was disclosure.12 This presumption often serves as a vehicle by which the wife is relieved of her
awesome burden of proving that there was not full disclosure. In order
to realize the broad implications of such a presumption, one need only observe that in practically every antenuptial contract the wife either waives
all rights, or the provisions for her are minimal and otherwise unreasonable. 29 This result is obviously due to a natural desire on the part of the
126. Hayes, Antenuptial Agreements, 42 ILL. B.J. 212 (1953).

127. 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS 90-42 (1964).
128. See Levy v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63, 43 A.2d 25 (1945); In re McClellan's Estate,
365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950); Lightman v. Magid, 54 Tenn. App. 701, 394 S.W.2d 151
(1965).
129. The determination of what constitutes a reasonable provision for the wife, the
lack of which gives rise to the presumption, has been an added difficulty for the courts.
Some courts have measured the reasonableness by a comparison to what the wife would
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husband to pass his property on to his relatives. Therefore, in almost
every instance of a litigated antenuptial contract, the wife, via this presumption, is given a powerful weapon. The existence of the presumption
reveals a basic bias in favor of the interests of the prospective wife at the
expense of the heirs of the husband.
Under the presumption of fraud or nondisclosure, the following hypothetical situation could easily occur: M, a 60-year-old widower, desires
to marry W, a 55-year-old spinstress, but wishes to have his property go
to his children by a former marriage. W, agreeing with M's, wish, goes
with M to the office of M's elderly lawyer friend where the following
interchange takes place:
Attorney:

"Miss W, do you understand the agreement by which you
waive all interest in M's estate?"

Miss W:

"Yes, I want the property to go to M's children. Besides, I
have some property of my own and I simply do not want his."

Attorney:

"Do you understand that M is a wealthy man? If you wish,
I will describe his assets."

Miss W:

"That will be unnecessary. As I said, I have utterly no interest in his property. I am marrying M solely for love and companionship."

Upon M's death, W decides that she is interested in sharing in M's estate
and attacks this agreement. Since the provision for her seems obviously
unreasonable, W is assisted in her attack by the presumption that there
was nondisclosure or concealment by M. The burden of proving full disclosure shifts to the children of M. Although the presumption is rebuttable, the burden of proof is staggering, especially since many, if not all,
of the people who witnessed the execution of this agreement have since
died. "From a practical point of view, this presumption, although rebuttable, is likely to cause the contract to be void, due to the fact that in the,
majority of cases the husband is dead and normally there are no other
witnesses to refute the wife's allegation."'' 0 Under these circumstances,
have received under the laws of descent and distribution. See, e.g., Rocker v. Rocker,
13 Ohio Misc. 199, 232 N.E.2d 445 (1967); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142
S.W.2d 737 (1940); In re Borton's Estate, 393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1964). Other courts have
looked to see if the provision will allow the wife to live as comfortably after the death
of the husband as she had previously. See, e.g., In re Groff's Estate, 341 Pa. 105, 19 A.2d
107 (1941); In re McCready's Estate, 316 Pa. 246, 175 A. 554 (1934). The most recent
method of determining reasonableness calls for a weighing of all the facts and circumstances
at the time of the agreement including the following: (a) the financial worth of the intended
husband; (b) the financial worth of the intended wife; (c) ages of the parties; (d) number
of children of each; (e) the intelligence of the parties; (f) whether the survivor aided in
the accumulation of the wealth of the deceased spouse; (g) the standard of living which
the survivor had before the marriage and could reasonably expect to have during marriage.
See In re Estate of Hillegass, 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968).
130. Note, Antenuptial Contracts Concerning Property Settlements, 33 Ky. L.J. 197, 199
(1944).
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there is no valid justification for relieving the wife of her normal burden
of proving the antenuptial contract invalid. There is no foreseeable danger in allowing a wife to bear this burden unaided by any presumptions.
The concept of divesting the wife of her long-recognized presumption
is apparently fair. Some jurisdictions, especially Pennsylvania, have
moved toward requiring the contesting spouse, whether man or woman, 1a
to meet an affirmative burden of proof without the aid of any presumption. 18 2 For example, in In re Estate of Hillegass,138 the court made the
valid, but often overlooked observation that varying decisions on antenuptial contracts have resulted in a lack of clarity, definiteness and certainty. The court then set out to clear away "the confusion and conflicts
resulting from different expressions of the applicable standards and principles by stating clearly and more definitely the applicable standards and
principles in this field.' 134 The Hillegass court held that the person seeking to nullify, avoid, or circumvent the antenuptial contract has the burden of proving the invalidity of the agreement by clear and convincing
evidence that the deceased spouse at the time of the agreement made
neither a reasonable provision for the intended spouse, nor a full and fair
disclosure of his or her worth. The effect of this rule, for all practical purposes, is to shift the burden from the heirs of the deceased husband to the
wife who is challenging the agreement. Although this rule has been applied
in only two subsequent Pennsylvania cases,'135 it has resulted in a greater
degree of fairness between the contracting husband and wife.
C. Groom's Disclosure Versus Bride's Inquiry
A classic and often repeated rule in the area of antenuptial agreements is that it is not for the woman to inquire but for the man to inform.13 6 This rule has often led to the inequitable result of allowing the

prospective wife to enter antenuptial negotiations with her eyes closed
and to later attack the agreement upon the ground that she did not realize
the extent of her husband's estate. It is time for the courts to ask themselves what danger there would be in imposing a duty upon the prospective wife, who contractually waives her rights upon the husband's death,
to inform herself of her prospective husband's property. This is not to
131. It should be noted, however, that the limited number of cases found demonstrate
that the presumption is reserved solely for the contesting wife. If a husband is contesting
the antenuptial contract he normally must bear the full burden of proof unaided by any
presumption, regardless of lack of provision made for him in the contract. See In re
McCready's Estate, 316 Pa. 246, 175 A. 554 (1934).
132. To a lesser degree other jurisdictions have decisions indicating such a movement.
See, e.g., Application of Liberman, 4 App. Div. 2d 512, 167 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1957); In re
Borton's Estate, 393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1964).
133. 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968).
134. Id. at 145, 244 A.2d at 675.
135. In re Estate of Lock, 431 Pa. 251, 244 A.2d 677 (1968) ; In re Estate of Harris,
431 Pa. 293, 245 A.2d 647 (1968).
136. See, e.g., Dennison v. Dawes, 121 Me. 202, 117 A. 314 (1922) ; In re Strickland's
Estate, 181 Neb. 478, 149 N.W.2d 344 (1967).
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suggest adherence to the doctrine "that a man and woman

.

.

are to be

treated like merchant princes dealing with each other each implemented
with the exacting and hard instruments of commercialism.' '1 37 However,
the more equitable approach would be to treat prospective spouses like
merchant princes at least insofar as to impose some duty of inquiry upon
the bride.
Perhaps the logic of this suggestion can be seen more vividly by
comparing today's situations to the action of contract rescission based
upon misrepresentation. Even where there is overt misrepresentation, the
majority of courts have imposed some duty of diligence upon the complainant, as opposed to allowing him to blindly rely upon the misrepresentations of, or lack of representation (in the case of some defect) by the
respondent. Courts have generally held that a person to whom a false
representation has been made is not entitled to relief where he might
readily have ascertained the truth by ordinary care and attention. 8
Thus, where the means of knowledge are at hand and are equally available to both parties, the subject matter is equally open to their inspection;
if one of them does not avail himself of those means and opportunities,
he may not later claim that he was deceived by the other's misrepresentation.' Of course, these courts do not require extreme diligence on the
part of the moving party; he does not have to investigate if it would
be impossible or he would be hindered by the acts of the defendant. There
would be little danger in placing some similar duty of diligence upon the
contracting spouses. Were a prospective wife required to investigate, there
would be some physical sacrifice involved. However, in instances where
the information is readily available, it is unfair to allow a wife to enter
the contractual relationship with eyes closed, knowing that should it turn
out to be a bad bargain, her own inattentiveness will afford grounds for
avoiding the agreement.
The first attack upon any suggestion that the wife be given a duty
of inquiry is based upon the idea that the prospective husband has an
emotional and intellectual dominance over the prospective wife which
naturally precludes the wife from investigating or demanding a list of the
husband's assets. Today, however, this idea of dominance by the bridegroom is no longer a reality in our society and, therefore, should not serve
to prohibit the imposition of a duty to inquire upon the wife. A second
argument against the wife's responsibility to inquire is the age-old refrain
that the rules of contract law simply should not be admitted into the area
of marriage relationships. Although the necessity of such a prohibition
may be questionable, this criticism could be blunted by placing upon the
contracting bride a duty of inquiry or investigation which is less than the
137. Levy v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63, 74, 43 A.2d 25, 30 (1945).
138. See 23 Am. JuR. Fraud and Deceit § 155 (1941); 55 Am. JuR. Vendor and
Purchaser § 62 (1946); J. DAWSON & G. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 390 (1969).
139. See Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1010 (1948).
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duty imposed upon an ordinary contracting party. In other words, though
courts perhaps should not require an extensive inquiry by the wife, she
should not be allowed to escape all responsibility. A satisfactory approach
to this problem would be to distinguish between a husband's affirmative
misrepresentation of his wealth and his simple failure to disclose the nature and extent of his assets. This distinction 140 could be expressed in
terms of misfeasance 4 versus nonfeasance.142 Under such an analogy,
if the prospective bridegroom takes it upon himself to disclose his assets
to the prospective wife incorrectly or fraudulently, then she should have
no duty to investigate. However, if he never undertakes to disclose his
assets, either because he honestly thinks he does not need to or because
he desires to keep property from his spouse, the prospective wife should
be held to the duty of either (1) investigating to determine the nature
and extent of his assets, or (2) insisting that he disclose his assets during
the negotiations.
The above distinction should satisfy those critics who are reluctant
to view the antenuptial contract in customary contract terms, since this
rule requires a lesser duty of the wife than is ordinarily required of a contracting party. Although the prospective wife should not be subject to the
doctrine of caveat emptor, she should at least be required to enter premarital contract negotiations with some degree of responsibility and
awareness of what is taking place.
V.

THE DILEMMA

Judges in the area of antenuptial contracts have found themselves
caught in the dilemma of providing for contractual freedom on the one
hand and, on the other hand, protecting the state against the support of unwanted wards. Often, the judiciary has found these two concerns to be irreconcilable, as reflected by so many ambiguous, unclear decisions. In
addition, attempts to reconcile these two concerns or interests have led
to splits of authority in this area of the law. Some judges refuse to enforce
such agreements altogether; or if such agreements are enforced, judges
43
apply contract law, developed essentially for commercial dealings.
There is a suggested solution to this dilemma which will provide for the
greatest possible inter-spousal freedom to contract and, at the same time,
will provide the greatest safety against state support of spouses. The
optimum legal solution would avoid treating prospective spouses as freedealing merchant princes but would give them some contractual freedom.
140. This distinction could also be expressed in terms of actual fraud versus constructive

fraud, with inquiry by the prospective wife required in the latter but not in the former.
See In re Borton's Estate, 393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1964).
141. The improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1151 (4th ed. 1951).
142. The omission of an act which a person ought to do. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY
1208 (4th ed. 1951).
143. See McDowell, Contracts in the Family, 45 B.U.L. REv. 43 (1965).
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Initially, any successful solution to the problem depends upon the
determination of the primary state interest that demands protection in
the area of antenuptial contracts. Most writers agree that, despite the
poetic language certain judges have used to the contrary, the chief concern of the state clearly is to keep families together to avoid the possibility that a family member might have to depend upon the state for support."" Thus, the common denominator of concern in formulating any
rule is to insure that these antenuptial contracts will not shift the burden
of supporting the prospective spouse upon the state through its welfare
department. Further, it is mandatory that the courts determine whether
the state interest is (1) that husbands provide for their wives in the manner to which they have become accustomed or (2) that wives not be relegated to the welfare roles for their livelihood. The prime concern of the
state should be protection from having to support the spouse.
The rules used to solve this dilemma must have clarity and predictability. If the policy is to allow parties to antenuptially determine property rights, then there must be rules that will facilitate and guide premarital planning. The present guidelines presented in decisions involving
antenuptial contracts are uncertain and unpredictable. One is led to the
conclusion that the attorney can give the client desiring such a contract
only the "odds" of its being enforced. Many enter these arrangements with
a less than positive philosophy. The few writers in this area, after attempting to give a coherent account of the applicable rules, end with a list of
guidelines for the drafting and execution of these contracts. 1 45 These
guidelines serve as suggestions, or checklists, to enable the attorney to
operate in an area in which the rules are so uncertain that all one can do
is simply take safeguards and hope for the best. The prevailing sense of
uncertainty suggests that the increased use of antenuptial contracts has
been in spite of, rather than due to, the applicable rules governing them.
In devising a rule to meet this dilemma, many would suggest that
women and men should be treated equally. Although this approach may
be the correct and inevitable direction in which our society is moving, we
have not yet reached complete sexual equality. Therefore, any realistic
rule that may be devised will have to recognize this difference or inequality
in legal treatment. However, in formulating a new rule, courts must not
allow this sexual distinction to create an unrealistic imbalance in favor
of the woman. Our new rule must obviously be sufficient to insure that
the spouses knowingly enter into the contractual relationship. However,
such a rule must stop short of being so weighted against the prospective
husband with evidentiary burdens and presumptions that the prospective
wife carries no burden at all. 46
144. See Note, The Validity of Ante-Nuptial Agreements which Limit the Property
Rights of the Parties, 31 B.U.L. REV. 92 (1951).
145. See Hayes, Antenuptial Agreements, 42 IL. BAR J. 212 (1953).
146. For a suggested solution and set of rules for antenuptial contracts, see Appendix B
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CONCLUSION

The American Law Institute has viewed the overriding rule governing antenuptial contracts to be that "[a] bargain between married persons or persons contemplating marriage to change the essential incidents
of marriage is illegal."' 47 Within the framework of this rule, there is an
increasing trend toward interpreting the word "incidents" to mean only
those rights and responsibilities which arise during a going marriage. As
a result of this trend, the courts will continue to rigidly enforce this rule
to void any antenuptial contract which provides: (1) that the husband
and wife will forgo sexual intercourse; (2) that the wife will be allowed
to choose the domicile of the spouse; or (3) that the husband and wife
will never live together.
On the other hand, there will be increasingly more judicial recognition of the right and power of prospective spouses to determine contractually the incidents that arise upon the termination of a going marriage.
In the wake of this trend, engaged parties will be given more latitude to
determine alimony and property settlement upon divorce, as well as property rights upon death.
This latter trend does exist and, if it is to be meaningful, the courts
must develop corresponding rules which are comprehensive, clear, predictable, socially relevant and cognizant of the pertinent public interests.
VII. APPENDIX
A. People Who Use Antenuptial Contracts
In order to determine exactly what group of people are most often
using the antenuptial contract, this writer surveyed all antenuptial contract cases cited in volume sixteen of the Seventh Decennial Digest covering the years from 1956 to 1966. These cases were read to determine three
factors: (1) whether either party had previously been married; (2)
whether either party had had children by a previous marriage; and (3)
the age of the parties at the time of contracting. This survey revealed the
following:
State & Year
of Case

Spouse

Previous
Marriage

Children

Age

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Husband

Yes

Yes

?

Arkansas 1961

Husband
Wife

?
?

?
?

50
50

Arkansas 1966

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

67
48

California 1956

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
84

Alabama 1959

Arizona 1963

Wife

147. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 587 (1932)

Yes

Yes

(emphasis added).

?

1972 ]

THE ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT

State & Year
of Case

Spouse

Previous
Marriage

Children

Age

California 1956

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

?
?

?
91

Colorado 1964

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

64
62

Florida 1962

Husband
Wife

Yes
?

Yes
?

71
35

Florida 1961

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

68
35

Florida 1964

Husband
Wife

Yes
?

Yes
?

61
51

Illinois 1960

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

81
48

Illinois 1963

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Indiana 1962

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

61
57

Husband

Yes
Yes

Yes

?

Indiana 1957

Husband
Wife

Yes
?

Yes
?

75
?

Maine 1961

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Mass. 1960

Husband
Wife

Yes
?

Yes
?

?
?

Michigan 1962

Husband
Wife

?
?

?
?

?
?

Missouri 1962

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Missouri 1962

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

49
39

Kansas 1963

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

?
?

?
?

Kansas 1965

Husband
Wife

Yes
No

Yes
No

76
57

Kansas 1962

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

72
50

Kansas 1961

Husband
Wife

?
?

?
?

75
?

Nebraska 1963

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

New York 1958

Husband
Wife

Yes
?

Yes
?

?
?

New York 1963

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

72
57

New York 1957

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

New York 1959

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

64
44

Indiana 1962

Wife

Yes

?
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State &Year
of Case

Spouse

Previous
Marriage

Children

Age

Husband
Wife

Yes
?

?
?

65

New York 1961
New York 1963

Husband
Wife

Yes
?

Yes
?

Ohio 1962

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

50
50

Ohio 1958

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Ohio 1959

Husband
Wife

?
?

?
?

?
?

Ohio 1959

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Ohio 1962

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

71
62

Oklahoma 1957

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Oklahoma 1957

Husband
Wife

No
Yes

No
Yes

60
55

Oregon 1957

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Penn. 1962

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Penn. 1961

Husband
Wife

Yes
?

Yes
?

?
?

Penn. 1957

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

50
50

Tenn. 1956

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

?
?

?
?

Tenn. 1964

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

?
?

Tenn. 1965

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

70
58

Texas 1960

Husband
Wife

?
?

?
?

59
56

Texas 1964

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

55
55

Virginia 1957

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

54
44

Wisconsin 1965

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

43
33

Wisconsin 1959

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

51
43

Wisconsin 1959

Husband
Wife

Yes
No

Yes
No

66
48

Wisconsin 1958

Husband
Wife

Yes
No

Yes
No

49
23

Wyoming 1964

Husband
Wife

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

76
56
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Of the fifty-four cases surveyed, forty-eight (80%) of them involved
men who had been previously married. Of these forty-eight men, fortythree (90%) had had children from their former marriages. In only
twenty-nine (54%) of the fifty-four cases surveyed were the men's ages
reported. Among those whose ages were given, the average age at the time
of contracting was sixty-three. Ninety-one percent of these twenty-nine
men were over fifty years of age. Twenty-five cases revealed no ages for
the men. However, the great number who had been previously married
and had had children would indicate that even more were of middle age
and over.
Of the fifty-four cases surveyed, thirty-eight (70%) involved women
who had been previously married. Of these thirty-eight women, thirty-six
(94%) had children from their former marriages. In only twenty-six
(49%) of the fifty-four cases surveyed were the women's ages given.
Among these whose ages were reported, however, the average age, at the
time of the antenuptial contract was executed, was forty-nine years. Of
these twenty-six women, eighty-one percent were over forty years old.
B. A Suggested Solution
I. Rules Governing Antenuptial Contracts Stipulating Property Rights
Upon Divorce and Death:
A. Contracts entered into before marriage settling property
rights in the event of divorce or death are favored in the
law, because they tend to promote domestic happiness and
adjust property questions which might otherwise become a
source of litigation. These agreements are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of the makers, and are
to be upheld when they are understandingly made and are
not obtained by fraud or overreaching.
B. To assure that these contracts are knowingly entered into
and that each spouse is fully aware of the rights which he is
waiving, the execution of these agreements should have the
following features :148
1. Attorneys should be present to represent each party to
the contract. 4 9
2. A listing in the contract of each spouse's interest in the
following types of properties: 15
148. It should be pointed out that these features are aimed at aiding full disclosure and
mitigating fraud and misrepresentation. These are offered to complement, not replace, those
statutory requirements already imposed by some states to govern execution of antenuptial
contracts, i.e., that antenuptial contracts must be in writing, that they must be signed by
a specified number of witnesses, that they must be recorded, etc.
149. This safeguard has already been suggested by some recent courts as an indicator
that there has been good faith. See, e.g., Cantor v. Palmer, 166 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964) ; In re West's Estate, 194 Kan. 736, 402 P.2d 117 (1965).
150. A few courts have already been faced with contracts containing an itemization
of property and have acted favorably toward them. However, these courts have placed
emphasis upon the spouses' placing an estimated value on the property listed. See Harlin v.
Harlin, 261 Ky. 414, 87 S.W.2d 937 (1935); Daniels v. Banister, 146 Ky. 48, 141 S.W. 393
(1911); Kingsby v. Noble, 129 Neb. 808, 263 N.W. 222 (1935), In re McClellan's Estate,
365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950). These courts apparently look to an estimate of value as
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

Real Property
Cash
Checking Accounts
Savings Accounts
Stocks
Bonds
Any other personal property worth more than
$500.
3. The agreement should be acknowledged before a notary
public by either of the parties who, via the contract,
is waiving rights in the other's property. Said acknowledgment should be substantially as follows: "I,
,a notary public in and for the said

county and state aforesaid, do hereby certify that
(Spouse Waiving Rights), personally known to me to
be the same person whose name is subscribed to the
foregoing antenuptial agreement, appeared before me
this day in person and acknowledged that she (he) has
read and fully understands the effect of the foregoing
agreement; that (Spouse Waiving Rights) knows and
has been apprised, in accordance with the requirements
of the law, of the major portion of the property, both
real and personal, owned by (Spouse Not Waiving
Rights), as well as his (her) income, and that she (he)
is satisfied with the provision made for her (him) in
the aforesaid agreement; that she (he) sealed and delivered the foregoing antenuptial agreement as her
(his) free and voluntary act for the uses and purposes
therein set forth.
Signature
C. The features enumerated in Part B are not essential to the
validity and enforceability of an antenuptial contract.1 51
However, their presence gives rise to a presumption that
there has been a full disclosure and a further presumption
that the agreement is valid and binding.
D. The presumption stated in Part C is irrebuttable as regards
lack of disclosure. In other words, if the features listed in
Part B are present, then this closes any inquiry into lack of
dlisclosure. However, the presumption is rebuttable as to
fraud committed in the execution of the agreement, i.e.,
where the listing of property in the contract was incorrect.
evidence that the waiving spouse is aware of what is being given up via the antenuptial
contract. Despite this basis for requiring value, it is suggested that a listing of the properties
without the corresponding estimated values would be preferable because (1) estimated
evaluation invites both conscious and mistaken underevaluation and thus invites attack
upon these agreements; (2) it would appear to be no overwhelming burden for a contracting spouse, usually the wife, to make, on the basis of the listed property, his (her) own
evaluation of what he (she) is giving up.
151. Except, of course, as one of these features might correspond to a state statutory
requirement which is a prerequisite to validity of the antenuptial contract.
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E.

F.

No lack of provision in the contract for a spouse will give
rise to any presumptions of nondisclosure, fraud, concealment, bad faith or overreaching. The spouses, before marriage, are free to waive all interests that may exist upon
divorce or death in the properties of each other.
If the contract stipulates property rights in the event of
divorce, then the contracting parties have the burden of
clearly separating alimony from property settlement provisions. Should they fail to meet this burden, i.e., a provision
which states "W to receive $1000 in full settlement upon
divorce," then the contract will be judged completely under
the rules applicable to antenuptial alimony provisions explained in the second section of these suggested rules (Part

II).
In the event that there remain those who choose to execute
antenuptial contracts not in compliance with the features
listed in Part B then, as to those contracts, the contesting
spouse, whether male or female, has the burden of proying
material concealment, misrepresentation or some form of
fraud.
Rules Governing Antenuptial Contracts Stipulating Alimony Rights
in the Event of Divorce:
A. These agreements are not automatically void as against
public policy but will be accepted and enforced in accordance with these rules.
B. These agreements are not to be automatically voided as
being conducive to divorce unless they contemplate some
fraud upon the court, i.e., a provision that one spouse will
not contest another spouse's divorce petition, a provision
that any divorce procured will be upon an agreed ground,
or a provision that the spouses will divorce each other
within a given period of time after the marriage ceremony.
C. If the contract complies with the prerequisites listed in
section B of Part I, then a presumption arises that there
has been a full disclosure with a further presumption that
the agreement is valid and binding.
D. The above presumption is irrebuttable regarding lack of
disclosure. In other words, if the prerequisites listed in section B of Part I are present, then this closes any inquiry
into lack of disclosure. However, the presumption is rebuttable as to fraud committed in the execution of the agreement, i.e., where the listing of the property in the contract
was incorrect.
E. If the contract is not in compliance with the three features
listed in section B of Part I, then there are no presumptions and the contesting spouse has the burden, in order to
overturn the agreement, of proving material concealment, misrepresentation, or some form of fraud.
F. Whether the wife receives a reasonable alimony provision,
G.

II.
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an unreasonable provision, or no provision at all, this situation will have no effect upon the enforceability of the
agreement and will have no effect upon the burdens of proof
as set forth in sections C, D and E.
G. These contracts, if valid in light of the aforementioned
rules, are absolutely binding upon the spouse who waives
rights in the other's property or income and are absolutely
immune from subsequent modification by the courts even
upon a showing of changed circumstances.152

H. Although such a contract will be permanently enforceable
against the wife without modification, it will not prevent a
claim by the Commissioner of Welfare against the husband
for reimbursement of payments made to the wife should
she be forced to seek welfare assistance prior to remarriage. To this extent, these agreements are subject to modification and will be so158modified by the courts upon petition
of the commissioner.

152. If the contract provides reasonably for the wife, however, this rule does not
affect the usual power of an equity court to modify that provision upon petition of the
husband that circumstances have changed rendering him less able to pay the stated amount.
153. This measure is aimed at mitigating the concern for the burden upon the public
purse and the concern for the welfare of divorced women. However, it is also a denial of
the concern that divorced women be supported in the same manner as during marriage.

